Intelligence Brief: Kaspersky Reports Ransomware Trends Targeting Latin America and Asia-Pacific in 2025

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Situational Awareness Terminal
[SYSTEM STATUS: OPERATIONAL]
[INGESTION RATE: — briefs/day]
[THREAT LEVEL: ELEVATED]

Source Credibility Index


Multi-source assessment (1 sources)(smetechguru.co.za)


3/5 — Generally Reliable


NATO C/3 — Fairly Reliable / Possibly True

1. BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

Ransomware activity in 2025–2026, as reported by Kaspersky via a single source, was characterized by a geographic focus on Latin America and the Asia-Pacific, the adoption of encryption-less extortion and post-quantum cryptography, and the emergence of new actors such as The Gentlemen. Law enforcement reportedly disrupted major ransomware service platforms by seizing underground forums in early 2026. This assessment is likely accurate but remains moderately confident (approximately 68%) due to reliance on a single, non-independent source and the absence of contradiction signals.

2. Key Judgments

  1. Ransomware groups in 2025 most frequently targeted organizations in Latin America, with secondary focus on Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, CIS, and Europe, according to Kaspersky's reporting.
  2. Operational tactics evolved to include encryption-less extortion, post-quantum cryptography, and the use of Telegram channels for data distribution.
  3. Law enforcement actions in early 2026 reportedly disrupted ransomware infrastructure by seizing major underground forums (RAMP, LeakBase), but the long-term impact on threat actor capability is unclear.
  4. New ransomware actors, notably The Gentlemen, emerged in 2026, indicating continued adaptation and resilience within the ransomware ecosystem.

3. Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)

Hypothesis Supporting Evidence Contradicting Evidence Evidence Gaps Probability
H-A: The reported trends—regional targeting, new extortion tactics, law enforcement disruption, and emergence of new actors—accurately reflect the 2025–2026 ransomware landscape. Consistent reporting from Kaspersky; no contradiction or denial signals; timeline matches known ransomware evolution patterns; law enforcement seizures of forums are plausible and align with prior global trends. Single-source reporting; no independent corroboration; possible selection bias toward regions or actors of interest to Kaspersky. Lack of multi-source confirmation; absence of technical indicators or victim reporting; unclear impact of forum seizures on actual ransomware activity. 65%
H-B: The reported trends are partially accurate but overstate the impact of law enforcement actions and the novelty of new actors/tactics. Ransomware forums have previously reconstituted after takedowns; emergence of new actors is a recurring phenomenon; single-source reporting may amplify certain narratives. No direct contradiction of law enforcement impact or novelty claims in the dossier; no alternative reporting to challenge Kaspersky's narrative. Independent assessment of forum takedown efficacy; third-party reporting on actor emergence and tactic adoption. 20%
H-C: The ransomware threat landscape did not significantly change in 2025–2026; the reported shifts are overstated or reflect normal fluctuation. Absence of multi-source confirmation; ransomware activity has historically shown cyclical patterns without transformative change. Specific claims of new tactics, actor emergence, and law enforcement disruption are not directly refuted; no evidence of status quo maintenance in the dossier. Broader industry reporting; victim and incident data from affected regions. 10%
H-D (Maskirovka / Strategic Deception): The event is a deliberate narrative shaping or disinformation effort by Kaspersky or associated actors. Potential for vendor-driven narrative to highlight threat landscape and law enforcement efficacy; single-source echo increases risk of narrative shaping. No overt signals of fabrication, denial, or adversary-driven deception; reporting aligns with established ransomware trends. Access to internal law enforcement reporting; adversary communications indicating narrative manipulation. 5%

ACH Assessment: H-A is currently best supported, as the reported trends align with known ransomware evolution and no contradiction signals are present. However, confidence is moderated by single-source reporting and the absence of independent corroboration. The lack of contradiction does not eliminate the possibility of selection bias or narrative shaping, but there is insufficient evidence to elevate alternative hypotheses.

4. Key Assumption Check (KAC)

  • Critical Assumptions:
    • Kaspersky's reporting is factually accurate and not selectively framed; if false, the assessment of regional targeting and tactic evolution could be significantly altered.
    • Law enforcement seizures of RAMP and LeakBase had a material disruptive effect; if these forums quickly reconstituted or were replaced, the operational impact would be limited.
    • Emergence of new actors (e.g., The Gentlemen) represents a genuine shift rather than rebranding or minor operational changes; if not, the threat landscape may be less dynamic than reported.
    • Encryption-less extortion and post-quantum cryptography adoption are widespread among ransomware groups; if these are isolated cases, the overall trend may be overstated.
  • Information Gaps:
    • Independent confirmation of regional targeting and victim impact (e.g., incident reports, insurance claims).
    • Technical indicators or forensic evidence of new tactics (encryption-less extortion, post-quantum cryptography).
    • Third-party reporting on the operational status of seized forums and subsequent ransomware activity.
    • Attribution or validation of new actor emergence from additional cybersecurity vendors or law enforcement agencies.
  • Bias & Deception Risks:
    • Framing bias: Kaspersky may emphasize regions or tactics of interest to its client base.
    • Selection bias: Single-source reporting risks echoing a narrow perspective.
    • Single-source echo: No independent corroboration increases risk of narrative reinforcement.
    • Cry Wolf pattern: Repeated claims of "new" actors or tactics may reflect normal threat actor churn rather than genuine innovation.
    • Adversary deception: No direct indicators, but vendor-driven reporting could inadvertently amplify adversary narratives or law enforcement efficacy.

5. Implications and Strategic Risks

The reported evolution in ransomware tactics and law enforcement disruption actions could alter the operational calculus for both threat actors and defenders. If new extortion methods and actor emergence persist, organizations in targeted regions may face increased risk and require adaptation of defensive strategies. The disruption of underground forums may temporarily fragment ransomware services but could also drive innovation or decentralization among threat actors.

  • Political / Geopolitical: Law enforcement successes may encourage further international cooperation, but could also prompt adversaries to shift operations to less regulated jurisdictions.
  • Security / Counter-Terrorism: Changes in ransomware tactics may complicate detection and response, increasing operational risk for critical infrastructure and high-value targets.
  • Cyber / Information Space: Adoption of post-quantum cryptography and new data distribution channels (e.g., Telegram) may challenge existing cyber defense paradigms and incident response protocols.
  • Economic / Social: Persistent ransomware activity in emerging markets (Latin America, Africa, Asia-Pacific) could exacerbate economic instability and erode public trust in digital services.

6. Recommendations and Outlook

  • Immediate Actions (0–30 days): Task collection for independent confirmation of regional targeting and forum takedown impact; monitor for technical indicators of new extortion tactics; engage with regional CERTs and law enforcement for situational awareness.
  • Medium-Term Posture (1–12 months): Develop resilience measures against encryption-less extortion and post-quantum cryptography; strengthen partnerships with global cybersecurity vendors and law enforcement; track actor reconstitution and forum migration patterns.
  • Scenario Outlook:
    • Best Case: Law enforcement disruption leads to sustained reduction in ransomware activity; new tactics remain isolated.
    • Worst Case: Ransomware actors rapidly adapt, decentralize operations, and expand targeting, leveraging new tactics at scale.
    • Most Likely: Temporary disruption is followed by adaptation and continued threat activity, with incremental adoption of new tactics and periodic actor turnover. Key triggers: emergence of successor forums, uptick in regional incidents, technical confirmation of new extortion methods.

7. Key Individuals and Entities

Name Role / Affiliation Relevance to Assessment
Kaspersky Cybersecurity vendor Primary source of reporting and analysis on ransomware trends and law enforcement actions.
Akira Ransomware group Identified as an active threat actor in the 2025–2026 period.
Clop Ransomware group Highlighted as a key entity in the ransomware ecosystem.
The Gentlemen Emerging ransomware group Noted for new data-centric extortion tactics and structured operations in 2026.
Law enforcement agencies Various national/international bodies Reportedly responsible for the seizure of major underground forums, impacting ransomware service infrastructure.
Qilin Ransomware group Listed as a relevant actor in the period under review.
RAMP, LeakBase Underground forums Reportedly seized by law enforcement, disrupting ransomware operations.

Structured Analytic Techniques Applied

  • Adversarial Threat Simulation: Model and simulate actions of cyber adversaries to anticipate vulnerabilities and improve resilience.
  • Indicators Development: Detect and monitor behavioral or technical anomalies across systems for early threat detection.
  • Bayesian Scenario Modeling: Quantify uncertainty and predict cyberattack pathways using probabilistic inference.



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